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Abstract: Conventional theory leads to expect bonds to be a financing vehicle for large firms because of 
economies of scale and contracting costs. We find both in our econometric evidence for firms quoted on Latin 
American stock exchanges, and in our survey results for Argentina, that size of assets is a robust determinant 
of the use of bond finance. This result, together with the fact that there are few firms that are large in terms of 
market value, can help understand why Argentina, as well as Latin America, has small bond markets in terms 
of the ratio of the stock of bonds to GDP. Since firm value represents the present value of the cash flows 
against which the firm borrows, the outstanding stock of corporate bonds is as small as the size of Argentine 
firms. 
 
JEL classification codes: G3, E6 





Our approach can be summarized as follows. We conjecture that the drivers of the debt 
structure of Argentinean and US firms are similar: incentive problems, as well as issue 
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costs and economies of scale. In particular, the second driver – issue costs and economies 
of  scale  –,  makes  firm  size  a  key  variable  to  understand  the  debt  structure  and  debt 
instruments chosen in Argentina, and more widely in Latin America. 
According  to  conventional  theory,  for  large  firms  bond  markets  are  a  source  of 
cheaper funds than bank credit. The reason is that contracting costs and economies of scale 
make it far more likely for big companies to issue bonds. We believe this view provides a 
key to understand whether the corporate bond market in Argentina is underdeveloped, and 
what the main determinants of the current situation are. 
Our econometric evidence, based on firms that are publicly quoted and traded on 
stock exchanges, indeed points to size as the main determinant of the use of bond finance, 
not only in Argentina but also in Chile and Colombia. On the other hand, with data that 
includes firms from Brazil and Peru too, we find that size does not have an important 
impact  on  leverage.  Size  does  lead  to  a  significantly  lower  share  of  short-term  debt. 
Indirectly, the negative relation between share of short term debt and size is related to the 
use of bonds by large firms, insofar as bond finance tends to be of much longer nature than 
bank finance. 
Additionally, according to our survey of non-financial corporations that includes 
firms that are not publicly quoted, only the very largest firms, by Argentinean standards, 
issue bonds. Independently of the criteria for size (employees, revenues or assets), there is a 
cut-off  below  which  almost  no  firms  in  the  survey  issue  bonds.  Since  the  survey  was 
designed to be representative of the universe of large firms in Argentina, this indicates that 
in countries like Argentina that have a very small number of big companies, the size and 
level of development of corporate bond markets will be largely determined by its small 
proportion of big companies. 
If our argument on size is correct, it leads to the question: Why are there so few 
large firms in Argentina, and can anything be done about that? Of course, the size of firms 
may be limited by the small size of the bond market, so there may be feedback effects we 
are not taking into account. However, we will argue that important policy actions have 
already been put in place in the past: until the late 1980s, corporate bond markets were non-
existent; then and in the early 1990s, institutional and tax reforms were put in place that   3 
strongly fostered the development of the corporate bond market. Hence, the reasons for the 
small size of the bond market may lay elsewhere. 
In what follows, after we address the general issue of debt structure of firms, we 
will then try to understand the determinants of the use of bonds as a particular form of debt, 
before looking more carefully into the issue of the size of firms. 
 
II. Theoretical determinants of debt structure and evidence from US firms 
 
The  natural  conceptual  framework  to  investigate  the  debt  structure  of  firms  is  the 
Modigliani-Miller “irrelevance” proposition. The Modigliani-Miller proposition states that 
the  financing  policy  should  not  be  expected  to  affect  the  firm  market  value  under  the 
following restrictive conditions: 
(i) There are no corporate or personal taxes, 
(ii) There are no contracting costs (in particular, no costs associated to financial difficulties 
and bankruptcy), 
(iii) The corporate investment policy is fixed (in particular, investment and operational 
decisions are not influenced by financing decisions), and 
(iv) There are no information costs. 
Empirically, the value of the firm is not independent of its financing policy, so the 
conditions  for  the  Modigliani-Miller  theorem  are  not  satisfied.  As  Barclay,  Smith,  and 
Watts (1999) argue, using the theorem in the logically equivalent way (A®B)º (~B® ~A), 
the financial structure of firms: 
(i) Must affect taxes paid by issuers or investors, given the specificities of corporate and 
personal taxes, or 
(ii) Must affect contracting costs (this may include costs of issuing debt, the probability and 
costs associated to getting into financial difficulty or bankruptcy, etc.), or 
(iii) Must affect management’s incentives to follow the value-maximizing rule of investing 
in all positive net present value (NPV) projects, or 
(iv)  Must  provide  a  credible  signal  to  investors  of  management’s  confidence  (or  lack 
thereof) about the firm’s future earnings, in a context of information costs and asymmetric 
information.   4 
In the United States, the third reason --incentive problems-- is by far the most important 
determinant  of  leverage  level  (Barclay,  Smith,  and  Watts  1999).  The  particular  debt 
instrument chosen, which in turn affects the maturity of the debt, is also affected strongly 
by the second reason --cost of issuing debt-- (Barclay and Smith 1999). 
We conjecture that the same reasons drive the financing decisions in Latin America and 
Argentina in particular. Before presenting our econometric results, it is important to explore 
how  financial  decisions  can  generate  incentives  in  managers  to  change  investment 
decisions (third reason). We will also review how the costs of issuing debt bring the size of 
the  firms  into  the  picture,  to  understand  the  debt  structure  and  debt  instruments  used 
(second reason). 
Suppose a firm is largely debt financed, and that due to a crisis the firm is not able to 
pay its debt. Suppose, furthermore, that new investment opportunities with positive NPV 
emerge. How will the firm respond to the investment opportunities? The stockholders, to 
the extent that they (and not the debt holders) decide about the investments, will probably 
not invest unless they negotiate a debt reduction. The reason is that a good part (or all) of 
their investment would become a transfer of money from them to the bondholders. So even 
though the projects themselves might be NPV>0 projects, that is not so for stockholders, 
who therefore have incentives to pass them up, reducing the value of the firm. In this way 
the financing decisions of the past may generate incentives to deviate from the strategy 
“invest in all positive NPV projects”. On the other hand, if the firm had been all equity 
financed, the stockholders would inject more cash in NPV>0 investments since that would 
increase their wealth. 
This likely development in the event of a crisis affects the financing decisions made 
beforehand. From the point of view of firm that does business in a region prone to crises, it 
is not a value maximizing strategy to have mostly debt financing.  The reason is that when 
calculating the present value of their cash flows (i.e., the firm’s value) one would have to 
allow for the probability of crises and the fact that in these circumstances managers will 
have incentives to pass up positive NPV projects. Alternatively one would assume that 
under  these  circumstances  the  company  would  default  on  its  debt;  anticipating  this, 
creditors would only provide financing at a very high cost.   5 
The best alternative is to have a debt structure less sensitive to crises. Debt structure 
is a multidimensional concept. We not only have the leverage ratio, but also the maturity, 
covenant  restrictions,  convertibility,  call  provisions,  security,  and  whether  the  debt  is 
privately placed or held by widely-dispersed public investors. Very important too are the 
expected costs of renegotiation (even if the “renegotiation option” is not explicitly written 
in the contract). 
Focusing on the leverage ratio and maturity, the arguments above suggest that firms 
whose managers have more discretion to change investment strategies would tend to have 
smaller leverage ratios and shorter maturities on their debt. A proxy for these companies is 
the market-to-book ratio. The difference between market value and book value of a firm 
reflects  the  value  of  investment  opportunities  (or  growth  options)  requiring  manager’s 
discretion to properly exploit them. If a company has a large market-to-book ratio such 
difference is large. On the other side of the spectrum, companies with a low market-to-book 
ratio are companies whose value comes primarily from assets in place that could serve as 
good collateral and should be expected to have higher leverage ratio and larger maturities.
1 
An alternative and related proxy is “tangibility”, the proportion of “fixed” assets 
over firm value. Note that the inverse of the market-to-book ratio is assets over firm value, 
so  the  two  variables  are  related.  However,  we  want  to  distinguish  between  the  two  to 
separate out the effect of those assets (“fixed”) that represent the best collateral. 
In  the  United  States,  companies  with  lots  of  investment  opportunities  (growth-
option  companies)  issue  less  debt  and  have  shorter  maturities.  This  not  only  protects 
lenders  against  the  greater  uncertainty  associated  with  growth  firms,  but  also  serves  to 
preserve their own financing flexibility and future ability to invest. Growth companies are 
also likely to choose private over public sources of debt because renegotiating a troubled 
loan with a banker (or a handful of private lenders) will generally be much easier than 
getting hundreds of widely dispersed bondholders to restructure the terms of a public bond 
issue (Barclay, Smith, and Watts 1999; Barclay and Smith 1999). 
                                                 
1 For Argentina, these factors seem to be relevant. While in 2004 the average leverage ratio for companies 
that were quoted on the stock exchange was 39%, for the 10% of companies with the smallest market-to-book 
ratio the leverage ratio was 61% and for the 10% of companies with the largest market-to-book ratio the 
leverage  ratio  was  16%.  In  comparison,  the  average  leverage  ratio  for  all  companies,  for  the  10%  of 
companies with the smallest market-to-book ratio and for the 10% of companies with largest market-to-book 
ratio was 33%, 42% and 9% in 1992, and 47%, 54% and 18% in 1998. Our data source is Economatica.   6 
Going  now  to  the  issue  of  contracting  costs,  according  to  conventional  theory 
different  forms  of  debt  have  different  natural  clienteles.  Banks,  for  example,  can 
economically provide finance for smaller borrowers, while bond markets, where issues are 
subject  to  a  substantial  minimum  efficient  scale,  can  do  so  at  lower  cost  for  large 
corporations with substantial funding needs. 
The fixed issue costs of public debt issues are generally much higher than the fixed 
costs  of  a  bank  loan  or  private  placement.  One  widely  cited  study  of  some  250  debt 
offerings in the US over the period 1979-1983 estimates that the average issue cost per 
$1000 was $11.65 for public debt, but only $7.95 for private debt (Blackwell and Kidwell 
1988). On the other hand the interest rate was lower for public debt than for private debt. 
Thus, larger firms issuing larger amounts of debt are more likely to issue public debt than 
smaller firms because they more than compensate the higher fixed costs with the lower 
costs of lower interest rates given the size of their issues. The average size of firms issuing 
public debt in the study cited above was 3.4 billion dollars of total assets, as compared to 
2.3 billion dollars of total assets for issuers of private debt.  Moreover, the size of the 
average public issue was roughly twice the average private issue (80 million dollars as 
compared to just under 40 million dollars). 
  This shows that due to contracting costs and economies of scale, the size of the 
firms should be a relevant variable to understand debt structure. Smith and Barcalay (1999) 
find a statistically significant positive effect of firm size on the leverage ratio for US firms.  
However, the economic impact of firm size on leverage is very small. For example, the 
largest firms had leverage ratios that were only about one percentage point higher than the 
average of 21%. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  find  firm  size  to  be  statistically  significant  and 
economically  important  to  determine  debt  maturity:  moving  from  the  10th  to  the  90th 
percentile for firm size increases the fraction of long term debt by 54% and reduces the 
fraction of short term debt by 70%. They attribute this effect of size on maturity to the 
difference of debt instruments available to small and large firms.  While small firms, due to 
issuing costs, borrow mainly from banks that for regulatory reasons cannot issue long term 
loans, large firms borrow a much larger proportion of their debt issuing bonds that tend to 
be of much larger maturity.   7 
III. Evidence on debt structure from firms quoted on Latin-American stock exchanges 
 
To reach a better understanding of the financing choices of Argentine firms, we study the 
behavior of a sample of firms that are publicly quoted on the stock exchanges of Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru using non-consolidated balance-sheet data.
2 
We start by looking at the behavior of the leverage ratio in our sample of firms, 
using a very stripped down model based on Rajan and Zingales (1995). We apply this same 
model to look into the debt structure of firms. 
We  first  consider  the  behavior  of  the  maturity  structure  of  debt,  where  debt  is 
comprised of bank debt and bonds, focusing on the short-term/long-term debt ratio. Insofar 
as bonds tend to have a longer maturity than bank debt, the short-term/long-term debt ratio 
is indirectly related to the use of bond finance. 
We then look directly at whether a firm issues bonds or not, before going into the 
determinants of the amount of bonds issued. We study the amount of bonds issued as a 
proportion  both  of  market  value  and  book  value  of  assets.  Since  we  are  particularly 
interested in the use of either bank or bond finance, we also look at the ratio of bond debt to 
bond plus bank debt. 
The estimation strategy followed is to estimate tobit models, since the dependent 
variable basically varies in the 0-1 interval, and there are many left-censored observations 
at 0. In the specific case of whether or not firms use bond financing, we estimate a probit 
model  because  the  dependent  value  takes  value  1  if  there  is  bond  financing,  and  zero 
otherwise. 
Our data source is the Economatica database, an equity analysis tool.
3 We have bi-
annual  data  over  the  1992-2004  period.  The  year  1992  is  the  first  for  which  we  have 
                                                 
2 The data source is Economatica. We chose unconsolidated data because more information is available for 
Argentina (Colombia only has unconsolidated data). For the regressions on the use of bond finance the sample 
is basically restricted to Argentina, Chile and Colombia, because in Peru at times only one firm used bond 
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currency, US dollars or the currency in which the original balance sheets were filed. Descriptive information 
for each firm includes industrial sector, type of asset, company ID, SEDOL code (an ID assigned by the 
International Stock Exchange of London), company web site, ticker, exchange where the asset is traded, 
names of main shareholders (and numbers of shares held), number of individual shareholders, etc.   8 
comprehensive data for Argentine firms. At any rate, before 1991 firms in Argentina had 
practically not issued bonds, regardless of firm size, due to the absence of an adequate legal 
framework. After that year, thanks to the legal changes introduced in the corporate bond 
law in 1991 that made the tax treatment of corporate bonds similar to sovereign bonds, thus 
making them more attractive in relation to bank loans, the legal framework no longer seems 
to have been a limiting factor.  
  Table 1 describes the variables in the dataset. We control for the presence of country 
fixed effects. In the panel estimates we also control for time effects, taking 1994 as the base 
year (since we lag the explanatory variables to avoid endogeneity problems, we lose the 
year 1992). 
 
Table 1. Description of variables in dataset 
Variable  Name  Definition 
Primary data     
fixed assets  Fixed assets  Book value of fixed assets, in thousands of US 
dollars 
assets  Total assets  Book value of total assets, in thousands of US 
dollars 
firm value  Market value of assets  Book value of debt plus market value of equity, 
in thousands of US dollars 
Dependent variables     
liabilities  Book value of liabilites  Total  assets  minus  stockholders  equity,  in 
thousands of US dollars 
short term debt/  
total debt 
Share of short term debt  Short  term  bank  debt  and  bonds  divided  by 
total bank debt and bonds 
bonds  Dummy for bonds  1  when  firm  has  bonds  outstanding,  0 
otherwise 
trade debt  Trade debt  Accounts  payable  and  long  term  supplier’s 
credit, in thousands of US dollars 
bank debt  Bank debt  Short and long term bank debt, in thousands of 
US dollars 
bond debt  Bond debt  Short  and  long  term  bonds  outstanding,  in 
thousands of US dollars 
Explanatory variables     
size  Size of firms  log(assets) 
tangibility  Tangibility of assets  fixed assets/assets 
q  Market to book ratio  firm value/assets 
roa  Return on assets  Ratio of net income to total assets 
dumleverage  Dummy  for  extremely  leveraged 
non-financial firms 
1  when  liabilities/firm  value>.9,  0  otherwise 
(alternatively: 1  when  1 liabilities/assets>.9,  0 
otherwise) 
country x, where 
x=arg, bra, chi, col, 
per 
Dummies for country fixed effects  1 when firm is from given country, 0 otherwise 
year t, where t=1996, 
1998,2000,2002,2004  
Dummies for time effects  1 when data is from year t, 0 otherwise 
   9 
A. Leverage 
 
We measure leverage as liabilities/firm value, the ratio of total liabilities to the market 
value  of  assets,  in  accordance  with  the  standard  practice  in  the  Finance  literature  of 
focusing  on  market  leverage.  However,  for  robustness  and  to  establish  a  link  with  the 
survey results below, we also look at book leverage measured as liabilites/assets, the ratio 
of total liabilities to the book value of assets. This is a broad definition of leverage, since 
total liabilities are larger than total debt, which consists of bank debt plus bonds. 
Our  specification  follows  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1995),  except  that  instead  of 
estimating a separate regression for each country, we pool the information and control for 
country fixed effects. We thus start by estimating the following basic regression that adds 
country dummies, where i stands for firm and t for time: 
 
leveragei,t = a + b1 sizei,t-2 + b2 tangibilityi,t-2 + b3 qi,t-2 + b4 roai,t-2 + country x + uit.     (1) 
 
The variable size is our key variable of interest. Though we do not expect size to 
affect leverage, our main conjecture is that size is an important determinant of the use of 
bond finance. While Rajan and Zingales (1995) measure size with the log of sales, we use 
the log of total assets. Rajan and Zingales find that size has a significantly positive relation 
to leverage in four of the G-7 countries, but in Germany it has a significantly negative 
effect. 
The control variables in Rajan and Zingales (1995) are: share of fixed assets over 
total assets, which has  a  positive effect on both market and book leverage in all G-7 
countries studied by Rajan and Zingales; the market to book ratio, which has a negative 
effect; and the return on assets, which almost always has a negative effect (only two out of 
fourteen  coefficients  are  positive,  but  these  are  not  statistically  significant).  To  avoid 
problems of endogeneity, the  explanatory variables are lagged two  years (however, the 
results using contemporaneous variables are pretty similar). 
Table  2  shows  our  tobit  estimates  for  market  leverage,  liabilities/firm  value,  in 
1998, a relatively normal year (columns 1 and 2), and 2002, a crisis year (columns 4 and 5). 
We control for country fixed effects, taking Brazil as the base country. Book leverage,   10 
liabilities/assets, is also reported (columns 3 and 6), but the results are not too different 
from market leverage. 
While column (1) points out a negative relationship between firm size and leverage, 
this result is not too clear-cut. In column (4) for year 2002, size is not significant, as is 
standard in many studies for US firms. However, in a regression with pooled data for the 
1994-2004 period, size has a significantly negative effect on market leverage (see Table 3, 
column 3, for a pooled regression). 
 
Table 2. Tobit regression models for leverage  




liabilities/firm value  liabilities/ 
assets 
liabilities/firm value  liabilities/ 
assets 
  (1) 1998  (2) 1998  (3) 1998  (4) 2002  (5) 2002  (6)2002 
size(-2)  -.3456   
(.1887)* 
-.1898   
(.1838) 
-.0271   
(.0278) 
-.0452   
(.1278) 
.0145    
(.1223) 
.0717   
(.0222)*** 
tangibility(-2)  .5178   
(.1847)*** 
.3458    
(.1820)* 
-.0041    
(.0061) 
-.0097   
(.0200) 
-.0245   
(.0199) 
.0023   
(.0033) 
q(-2)  -.3499   
(.2268) 




-.0101   
(.0122) 
-.0057    
(.0116) 
-.0010   
(.0023) 
roa(-2)  -.0261    
(.0111)** 
-.0035    
(.0124) 
-.0093   
(.0016)*** 
-.0255    
(.0072)*** 
-.0211    
(.0166) 
-.0027    
(.0011)** 
dumleverage    1.3681   
(.3645)*** 
.6358   
(.1519)*** 
  1.0737   
(.2245)*** 




  -.0622   
(.0250)** 
.0007   
(.0049) 
  .0071    
(.0181) 




-1.0203   
(.3519)*** 
-.7745   
(.3404)** 
-.0693   
(.0524) 
-.5731   
(.2881)** 
-.3552   
(.2769)     
.0146   
(.0484) 
chi  -.7099   
(.3576)** 
-.3840   
(.3494) 
-.0641   
(.0465) 
-.6219   
(.2148)*** 
-.3356   
(.2129) 
-.1010   
(.0366)*** 
col  -.3527   
(.5369) 
-.2254   
(.5150) 
-.1859   
(.0767)** 
.1336    
(.3750) 
.1509    
(.3565) 
-.1518   
(.0660)** 
per  dropped -  
collinearity 
dropped -   
collinearity 
-.4670   
(.3013) 
-.6718   
(.4719) 
-.3096    
(.4526) 
-.0396   
(.0732) 
cons  3.6084   
(1.1630)*** 
2.2223   
(1.1534)*      
.6633   
(.1645)*** 
1.5807   
(.7476)** 
.7917    
(.7447) 














LR chi2  48.39***  70.00***  114.22***  23.49***  50.76***  85.08*** 
Pseudo R2  0.0479  0.0693  0.4919  0.0255  0.0552  0.5982 
Number of 
observations        
239  239  287  256  256  306 
Left-censored 
observations 
2  2  2  4  4  1 
Note: Standard errors of coefficients within parenthesis. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. Peru country dummy 
per dropped due to collinearity in some regressions. In columns (2) and (5), dumleverage=1 when liabilites/firm value(-2)>0.9; in 
columns (3) and (6), dumleverage=1 when liabilites/assets(-2)>0.9. Source is Economatica, unconsolidated data. 
 
Consistent with our previous discussion, in 1998 tangibility and the market-to-book 
ratio q have the expected signs, though only tangibility is statistically significant (column 
1). Though in 2002 neither variable is statistically significant (column 4), in regressions   11 
that  pool  all  the  bi-annual  data  from  1994  to  2004,  lagged  tangibility  affects  market 
leverage  positively  and  lagged  q  affects  market  leverage  negatively  in  a  statistically 
significant way (see Table 3, column 3, for a pooled regression). This is similar to the 
results in Rajan and Zingales (1995). We had initially conjectured that because of slow and 
uncertain legal proceedings, tangibility might not be a relevant variable to determine debt 
levels in Argentina and Latin America in general. The present results suggest otherwise, 
though this need not mean that collateral is as effective as in the United States to get access 
to more credit. 
Return on assets roa has a negative relationship to liabilities/firm value both in 1998 
and 2002 (columns 1 and 4). Though this result is pretty common in the Finance literature, 
this is unexpected if market leverage represents the availability of credit, as is implicit in 
our  research  strategy.  More  financing  should  be  available  to  firms  with  higher  returns 
because,  among  other  things,  higher  returns  can  be  an  indication  of  better  corporate 
governance (cf. Bebczuk 2004 for case of firms in Argentina), so this should increase the 
willingness of borrowers to lend funds to the firm. 
Indeed,  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1995)  point  out  that  leverage  is  an  inherently 
ambiguous measure of credit availability: the firm’s debt ratio is simultaneously determined 
by the firm’s demand for credit and the supply of credit. In their sample of small firms, they 
find that large firms have a higher debt-to-assets ratio, which is consistent with higher 
quality firms having larger credit availability. However, more profitable firms have a lower 
debt ratio, which may be due to a lower demand for external credit instead of a supply 
effect because of rationing by creditors. 
Another angle we explore here is that high leverage might not indicate high credit 
availability, but rather  firms in financial distress that are overindebted. To explore this 
hypothesis, we modify the basic Rajan and Zingales setup by introducing dumleverage, a 
dummy that take value 1 for firms that were extremely indebted in the past. Given that we 
exclude financial firms from our sample, we take a past level of leverage (two years before) 
larger than .9 as an indication of firms that may be financially distressed. 
Using past leverage, we find that the negative effect of roa on current leverage is no 
longer statistically significant in columns (2) and (5). That is, a large part of the negative 
effect of profitability on leverage was due to firms that were highly indebted in the past.   12 
When all the bi-annual data over the 1994-2004 period are pooled, it turns out that roa still 
has a significantly negative effect on leverage. However, this effect is a lot smaller once 
dumleverage*roa is introduced: the effect of highly indebted firms is significantly negative 
and twice as large in magnitude. 
These  results  suggest  that  overindebtedness  is  in  part  driving  the  result  of  the 
negative  relationship  between  profitability  and  leverage.  Perhaps  financially  distressed 
firms with higher returns are forced to cancel debt. Given that this might be an alternative  
way to interpret the negative influence of return to assets on leverage, we explore this 
further below when we look at the term structure of debt: a restriction of credit should 
affect more short-term credit in contrast to long term credit, which has more inertia and is 
affected by decisions taken far back in the past. 
An alternative interpretation of roa is that it may indicate riskiness, insofar as high 
return is associated to high risk. In that case, it would not be surprising to find that roa is 
negatively related to market leverage and credit availability. This could also help explain 
why  highly  leveraged  firms  have  a  stronger  negative  response  to  roa,  because  highly 
indebted firms are more liable to go into default. If high return indicates high risk, one 
should also expect firms with higher roa to have more short term credit, a problem that 
should be especially acute for highly leveraged firms. We look at this below. 
To see the robustness of the cross-section results for leverage, we estimate random-
effects tobit regressions in Table 3 using bi-annual data from the 1994-2004 period. In 
addition to controlling for country effects, we also control for time effects: 
 
leveragei,t = a + b1 sizei,t-2 + b2 tangibilityi,t-2 + b3 qi,t-2 + b4 roai,t-2 + country x + year t + uit,   (2) 
 
A regression with pooled data is included in column (3) for purposes of comparison 
to the panel models of market leverage. On the other hand, a pooled regression with a 
specification like the panel model of book leverage in column (4) is not shown because the 
results are remarkably similar. 
With the exception of tangibility, the coefficients of random-effects panel in column 
(2) have the same sign as the coefficients in pooled regression in column (3),  so the results 
are in accordance with cross-section regressions. However, none of the variables except for   13 
the dummy dumleverage has a significant effect on market leverage. The Wald test does 
not reject the null hypothesis that the model has no joint explanatory power. 
The panel for the book value of assets in column (4) has similar signs of coefficients 
as  column  (2),  and  in  this  case  the  market-to-book  ratio  q  and  roa,  as  well  as 
dumleverage*roa, have a significantly negative effect on leverage. Here, size has no impact 
on leverage once we control for all variables in dataset. 
 
Table 3. Tobit regression models for leverage  
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, bi-annual data 1994-2004 
Explanatory 
variables 
liabilities/firm  value  liabilities/ 
assets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
size(-2)  -.1119   
(.4041) 
-.0605   
(.3949)   




tangibility(-2)  .0321    
(.1191) 
-.0091   
(.1204) 
.05159    
(.0196)*** 
-.0004    
(.0007) 
q(-2)  -.0857    
(.0504)* 
-.0786   
(.0490) 
-.0233   
(.0090)*** 
-.00812    
(.0031)*** 
roa(-2)  -.0207   
(.0198) 
-.0024   
(.0266) 
-.0084   
(.0047)* 
-.0040    
(.0012)*** 
dumleverage    1.2416   
(.6998)* 






  -.0218   
(.0397) 
-.0163   
(.0070)** 




-.4171   
(.8152) 
-.2167   
(.8028) 




chi  -.5777   
(.6745) 
-.2465   
(.6884) 




col  .1051    
(1.267) 
.2013   
(1.2353) 




per  -.4028   
(1.6421) 
-.2011    
(1.6040) 




cons  2.0803 
(2.4561)      
.6557   
(2.3535) 




year dummies  yes   yes  yes  yes 




Pooled data  Random- 
effects panel 
Wald chi2  6.32  10.04  -  424.77*** 
LR chi2  -  -  234.70***  - 
Pseudo R2  -  -  0.0386  - 
Number of 
observations        
1473  1473  1473  1715 
Left-censored 
observations 
17  17  17  7 
Number of 
firms 
454  454  -  539 
Notes: Standard errors of coefficients within parenthesis. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. In columns 
(1)-(4), dumleverage=1 when liabilites/market value assets(-2)>0.9; in column (5), dumleverage=1 when liabilites/book value 
assets(-2)>0.9. Source is Economatica, unconsolidated data. 
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B. Maturity structure 
 
We now explore the determinants of the maturity structure. This issue is related to the use 
of bond finance, since bonds typically have a longer maturity than bank loans. 
As argued before, the debt structure should make the company and their lenders less 
sensitive to crises.  In equilibrium this implies that the typical maturity should be shorter in 
a crisis prone country than in the United States. The lender will not be willing to lend 
money  for  the  long  term  knowing  that  the  probability  of  a  crisis  (that  would  imply  a 
default) is high unless the interest is extraordinarily high; in that case the borrower, facing 
such a steep term structure, will prefer to use debt of shorter maturity. 
Table 4 shows our estimates, where we start out with size, and then control for other 
variables. The variable size has a strong negative effect on the share of short-term debt 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is robust to all the controls we 
introduce, and consistent with a story based on contracting costs and economies of scale. 
The variable tangibility is significant at the 10% level, but it has a sign opposite to 
that expected based on the reasons given above (on the other hand, though the market-to-
book q has a positive effect, it is not significant once all controls are introduced). 
The country effect for Chile is significant, indicating that it has less short-term debt 
than Brazilian firms (our reference case), as well as firms from Argentina, Colombia and 
Peru.  That  Chile  has  a  negative  coefficient  might  be  explained,  following  the  earlier 
arguments on incentive problems, by the fact that Chile is less affected by crises than other 
countries. 
Above, we argued that leverage may be affected by financially distressed firms that 
are overindebted. If so, this can be expected to be reflected in the maturity structure of firm 
debt: insofar as short-term debt represents recent decisions, because its maturity is less than 
one year, while long-term debt is locked in for longer periods of time, once creditors refuse 
new credit to the firm this would be quickly reflected in a drop in short term debt. Hence, in 
column (3) of Table 4.4 the variable dummyleverage*roa is introduced. 
Once  one  controls  for  the  presence  of  highly  indebted  firms,  firms  with  higher 
returns have larger short-term debt. In this regard, short-term debt may reflect availability 
of credit in the margin better than liabilities, because the current levels of debt are less   15 
affected by past decisions that have nothing to do with the present willingness of creditors 
to give loans (as for example the recent crisis of Argentina attests). 
 
Table 4. Tobit regression models for share of short-term debt 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, bi-annual data 1994-2004 
Explanatory 
variables 
short term debt/ 
total debt 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
size(-2)  -10.8800 
(1.1113)*** 
-14.4823   
(1.7874)*** 
-14.6794   
(1.7929)*** 
-14.4662    
(1.2647)*** 
-14.4850   
(1.7884)*** 






.0637     
(.0376)* 






1.1976    
(.7846) 






.1604   
(.0725)** 
dumleverage      -4.7969   
(2.0373)** 
-4.5106   
(2.1282)** 


















3.6778   
(3.6956) 
chi    -11.1618    
(3.1344)*** 
-13.2237   
(3.2134)*** 
-14.3297   
(2.2546)*** 
-11.1386   
(3.1363)*** 




-1.3891     
(3.8326) 
.5936    
(5.1533) 
per    -2.5992 
(4.9348) 
-3.5219    
(4.9377) 
-3.2735     
(4.5946) 
-2.5836   
(4.9320) 
cons  109.3809   
(5.8396)*** 
128.1465   
(10.2245)*** 
128.9015   
(10.1612)*** 
130.6402   
(7.5667)*** 
125.9815   
(10.010)*** 
year dummies  no  yes  yes  yes   yes 






Pooled data  Random-effects 
panel 
Wald chi2  95.85***  83.27***  97.67***  -  86.81*** 
LR chi2  -  -  -  164.61***  - 
Number of 
observations        
2903  1490  1490  1490  1490 
 
Pseudo R2  -  -  -  0.0113  - 
Left-censored 
observations 
50  16  16  16  16 
Number of 
firms 
795  491  491  -  491 
Notes: Standard errors of coefficients within parenthesis. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. In columns 
(1)-(4),  dumleverage=1  when  liabilites/firm  value(-2)>0.9;  in  column  (5),  dumleverage=1  when  liabilites/assets(-2)>0.9. 
Source is Economatica, unconsolidated data. 
 
 
Alternatively, we conjectured that roa could instead reflect riskier, lower quality 
firms. One would then expect these firms to have a larger share of short term debt, and this 
effect should be especially strong for highly indebted firms. While we observe the first 
effect, we do not see the second: highly leveraged firms with high returns have less short   16 
term credit. This is an indication that our first interpretation, namely, that short-term debt 
reflects credit availability in the margin better than leverage, might be at work.
4 
  
C. Use of bond finance 
 
We  now  look  at  the  question  of  bond  finance,  with  data  from  Argentina,  Chile  and 
Colombia (Peru has almost no observations, and the data from Brazil was presented in a 
way difficult to aggregate for us). We first ask whether firms issue (1) or do not issue (0) 
bonds. We estimated in column (1) of Table 5 a random-effects probit model using panel 
data. Our random-effects panel estimates show that size is a very significant determinant of 
the use of bond finance, which is consistent with the cost of issuing and economies of scale 
hypothesis.  Controlling  for  other  factors,  firms  in  Chile  and  Colombia  have  a  greater 
likelihood of resorting to bond finance that firms in Argentina. The other control variables 
do not have any clear and systematic relationship to the decision to issue bonds. 
Our next step is to look at the behavior of bond debt/firm value, as well as bond 
debt/assets (to link the regressions to survey results), using random-effects tobit panel. The 
tobit estimates measure the quantitative effect of size on financing choices. To be brief, we 
only present the full estimates with all the variables. In column (2) of Table 5 we find that 
size is positively related to bond debt/firm value. The use of book values in column (3) does 
not affect these results at all. 
Since both bank and bond debt increase with size, our last question is which of these 
two sources of finance increase more with size. Column (4) of Table 5 looks at the behavior 
of bond debt/(bond +bank debt) with panel data from 1994-2004 using random-effects tobit 
regressions. The ratio of bonds to bank plus bond debt strongly increases with size. 
In the case of Argentina, the corporate bond market was only starting to take off in 
1992, thanks to the legal changes introduced in the corporate bond law in 1991 that made 
tax treatment of bonds similar to sovereign loans. Hence, one would not have expected to 
find any relationship between size and bond finance before that. The fact that size is indeed 
an important determinant of the use of bond finance, and of the amount used, can be linked 
                                                 
4 An even better measure of credit availability would be unused credit lines. Streb et al. (2001) explore this 
idea,  based  on  loan  commitment  contracts  in  Melnik  and  Plaut  (1986).  Another  possibility  would  be  to 
consider jointly both leverage and spread, or rating, of firm debt.   17 
with our initial hypothesis that what drives the development of bond markets in Argentina 
(and Latin America) are large firms, because of the fixed costs of issuing bonds and the 
economies of scale. 
 
Table 5. Random-effects regressions for issue of corporate bonds and bond debt ratios 










(bond +  bank 
debt) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
size(-2)  1.4688 
(.1975)*** 
.0997   
(.0155)*** 
.0830   
(.0097)*** 
.2651   
(.0354)*** 
tangibility(-2)  -.0006    
(.0050) 




.0006    
(.0020) 
q(-2)  .0081    
(.0283) 
-.0007    
(.0030) 
-.0004    
(.0024) 
.0121     
(.0155) 
roa(-2)  -.0069    
(.0054) 
-.0023    
(.0006)*** 
-.0007   
(.0003)** 
-.0023    
(.0012)* 




.1401     
(.0180) 
.5183    
(.0549)*** 
col  .8461    
(.4483)* 
.0980    
(.0384)** 
.0670    
(.0273) 
.3312    
(.1019)*** 
cons  -6.5720   
(.5936)*** 
-.7128    
(.0928)*** 
-.5753   
(.0580)*** 
-1.8084   
(.2170)*** 
year dummies  yes  yes  yes   
Method  probit  tobit  tobit  tobit 
Wald chi2  65.28***  77.02***  113.37***  123.66*** 
Number of 
observations        
1385  1190  1385  1188 
Left-censored 
observations 
-  768  912  715 
Number of 
firms 
412  354  412  371 
Notes: Standard errors of coefficients within parenthesis. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. Source is 
Economatica, unconsolidated data. The figures of bond debt for Chile were adjusted to include items that were reported in a 
different format than other countries. 
 
 
IV. Few large firms in Argentina? 
 
If large firms in Argentina and Latin America issue bonds, and the amount used of bond 
finance increases with size, then a possible explanation for the small development of the 
corporate bond market in Argentina and Latin America in terms of GDP is that there are 
few large firms. Another is that large firms issue bonds, but they rely less on bond finance 
than, for example, comparable firms in the United States. We look into this now. 
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A. Corporations quoted on stock exchange 
 
We compared the Argentine corporations quoted on the stock exchange to similarly sized 
firms in the US. For this purpose, we resorted to the Economatica database. Since we do 
not have information on bond issue for US firms, we look instead at the maturity structure 
of debt. 
  We first classified Argentine corporations quoted on the Merval according to the 
size of their assets. Though they are all large firms by Argentine standards, we divided the 
firms in Table 6 into large firms (assets of 3.2 billion dollars or more) and small firms 
(assets  below  3.2  billion  dollars).  The  table  shows  that  larger  firms  have  larger  book 
leverage (gross debt over total assets) and a lower participation of short term in total debt. 
The main difference between both groups lies in the reliance on short term debt. 
 
Table 6. Financial indicators of Argentine corporations quoted on stock exchange, 1998 
  Short term debt/total debt  Leverage (Gross debt/assets)  No. firms 
Large firms  19.9   38.7     10 
Small firms  52.1   28.7     70 
Total  49.7   29.4     80 
Note: large firms have (book value) of assets between 3.2 and 13.1 billion US dollars. Small firms have (book value) of 
assets between 10 million and 2.4 billion US dollars. Source: Economatica 
 
  We then looked at the same indicators for US corporations. To be able to compare 
US corporations to Argentine corporations according to size, we divided the US firms in 
Table 7 into three groups: very large (assets above 13.2 billion dollars), large and small 
corporations. The very large US firms are larger than any Argentine firms. The group of 
large US firms is comparable to large Argentine firms, and the same holds for small firms 
in  the  United  States  and  Argentina.  In  the  United  States,  neither  leverage  nor  the 
participation of short term debt over total debt varies a lot over the range of sizes we are 
considering (and in the sample we are analyzing). 
   19 
Table 7. Financial indicators of US corporations quoted on stock exchange, 1998 
  Short term debt/total debt  Leverage (Gross debt/assets)  No. firms 
Very large firms  24.2   29.0     92 
Large firms  20.6   31.7     248 
Small firms  25.1   26.0     340 
Total  22.8   27.4     680 
Note: very large firms have (book value) of assets between 13.2 and 355.9 billion US dollars. Large firms have (book value) 
of assets between 2.4 and 13.1 billion US dollars. Small firms have (book value) of assets between 10 million and 2.4 billion 
US dollars. Source: Economatica. 
 
An interesting result that springs from this comparison is that there is no major 
difference between US and Argentine firms in our sample as to leverage: the average in 
Argentina is 29%, versus 27% in the United States. However, there is a big difference in 
relation to the maturity of their debt: in Argentina short term debt represents 50% of total 
debt, in contrast to 23% in the United States. This difference is explained by Argentine 
firms that have smaller size, since the larger firms have a ratio very similar to US firms 
(besides having access to international markets). 
Hence, once one controls for size, these results point in the direction that the largest 
firms in Argentina are similar to comparable firms in the US as to leverage and reliance on 
short term debt. The differences spring out when one goes down to the next tier of firms. 
Even though these smaller firms have similar leverage to comparable US firms, they have a 
much greater reliance on short term debt. 
The maturity structure is indirectly related to the use of bond finance, since bonds 
tend to be longer term than bank loans. According to Kidwell and Blackwell (1988), the 
issuers of bonds in the US had on average assets of 3.4 billion dollars, compared to 2.3 
billion dollars of issuers of private placements. Hence, one would expect bond issues to be 
concentrated amongst what we call the large and very large firms, i.e., firms that have 2.4 
billion US dollars or more in assets. Since there are no differences among firms above that 
level as to maturity structure, this evidence does not seem to indicate that the problem is 
that large firms in Argentina issue less bonds than large firms in the United States. More 
direct evidence would, of course, be relevant to settle this issue. 
The  results  in  Tables  6  and  7  points  to  the  second  explanation  for  the  small 
development of the corporate bond market, that there are few large firms in Argentina, and 
these large firms are not too large. Indeed, on the basis of the Economatica sample, there   20 
are 92 very large firms in the United States, compared to none in Argentina (see Tables 6 
and 7). 
The available evidence, for example on average employees per firm, also suggests 
that firms in Argentina tend to be of smaller size than in the United States. Starting from 
Gibrat’s law of proportional growth of firms, Herbert Simon many times discussed the 
reasons for a Pareto distribution for firm sizes. In this regard, if Argentine firms follow a 
Pareto distribution like U.S. firms, a smaller average firm size of Argentine firms would 
imply by itself that there is a smaller proportion of large firms in Argentina (Axtell 2001). 
The problem with having direct information on the size distribution of firms in Argentina is 
that because of the huge size of the informal economy, that is concentrated in small firms, 
the number of small firms is underreported; in contrast, the United States has a lot better 
statistics in census of all firms in economy. 
The vast majority of Argentine firms, which are not public, are a lot smaller than the 
firms included in Table 6, so they presumably have less access to credit, and more reliance 
on short term credit, than the firms included here. The results of the survey to firms confirm 
this. We turn to this now.  
 
B. Survey of non-financial firms 
 
The econometric estimates in this chapter point in the direction that the size of firms is a 
relevant factor that determines the use of bond financing in Latin American countries. This 
is not too surprising by itself, since the United States shows the same pattern. In the United 
States, larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to issue publicly traded debt and 
commercial paper. However, our econometric results above are based on firms that are 
quoted on the stock exchange. Though these firms are few and small by US standards, they 
are much larger than the typical Argentina firm. 
Our survey of nonfinancial firms (see Alegre, Pernice and Streb 2007) shows that 
the average assets of the 8 firms issuing corporate bonds was 2.5 billion dollars, compared 
to 1 billion dollars of assets for those not issuing bonds (the average assets of whole sample 
of 56 firms was 2 billion dollars). These are large sizes, but firms that quote on the stock   21 
exchange are even larger (while only 15% of the firms in our survey of large firms issued 
stocks, 47% of firms on stock exchange issued stocks). 
The firms issuing bonds in our sample had on average 5000 employees, almost 4 
billion pesos in yearly revenue (1.3 billion dollars), and almost 8 billion pesos in assets (2.5 
billion dollars). Independently of the criteria for size (employees, revenues or assets), there 
is a cut-off below which almost no firms in the survey issue bonds. 
If one uses employment as size indicator, firms under 1500 employees in the sample 
practically do not issue bonds (only one of the eight cases). Of the firms larger than this 
size, 41% issued bonds. If one extends the interval to include firms with 1000 employees or 
more, this gives 37% of firms. Multiplying these percentages by the amount of firms that 
have more than 1500 employees  (more than 1000 employees) in Guia Senior gives  an 
estimate of 44 (60) firms issuing bonds in 2005. Our database of corporate bonds (see 
Bedoya,  González,  Pernice,  Streb,  Czerwonko  and  Díaz  Santillán  2007)  shows  that  56 
firms had outstanding bonds in December 2005 (there were 68 firms in December 2004, 
and 75 firms in December 2003, with outstanding bonds). Hence, this simple cut-off point 
can predict fairly well the universe of firms issuing bonds in Argentina. 
The survey is intended to be representative of large firms in Argentina, since the 56 
responses in the survey are taken from a sample of 766 firms with over 200 employees, or 
with over 150 million pesos in yearly revenue that mimic the survey of large firms carried 




Our results point in the following direction. A first fact is that in Argentina and  Latin 
America, the size of firms is a key determinant of the use of bond finance, just as it is in the 
United  States.  In  particular,  both  our  econometric  evidence  and  our  surveys  show  that 
larger firms rely more on bond finance. Theoretically, this can be explained by differences 
in contracting costs (specially fixed costs of bond issue), combined with the economies of 
scale which make bond issues the debt instrument of choice only for large firms and large 
issues.   22 
Furthermore, firms in Argentina (as in Latin America) tend to be a lot smaller than 
firms in the United States. We have basically compared firms that are publicly quoted on 
the stock exchanges of Argentina and the United States, but this should hold true if one 
looks at the complete universe of firms in both countries. 
The small size of firms in Argentina can help explain why the bond market is a lot 
less developed in Argentina, given the minimum size required for bond issues to be an 
attractive source of financing. The fact that many corporations in Argentina are reluctant to 
go public, and remain as closely held family businesses, might help explain this pattern of 
size distributions, as well as other features of capital markets. When one connects facts one 
and two, they imply that the overall size of the bond market in Latin America should be 
smaller than in the United States.  
Our  results  do  not  imply  that  institutional  factors  do  not  matter.  In  the  case  of 
Argentina, there was practically no corporate bond market before 1991. When bonds started 
to receive a tax treatment as favorable as bank loans, the market started to boom (this is the 
effect  of  the  violation  of  the  no-tax  hypothesis  of  Modigliani-Miller  irrelevance 
proposition). What our results may imply is that a large part of the institutional obstacles to 
bond finance were removed in the 1990s. 
However, other kind of institutional limits to the growth of firms seem to be present, 
given that most firms in Argentina still remain as small, closely held family firms. If, for 
example, for tax reasons firms do not have an incentive to release information, and this 
limits their possibility of going public, and hence their growth possibilities, the limitations 
to the bond market might in part be grounded in factors that go strictly beyond the costs of 
issuing bonds.  As a sample of the attitude towards releasing information, in question 5 of 
our  survey  76%  percent  of  small  firms  and  53%  of  the  big  firms  answered  that 
requirements of public information to issue bonds was either a problem or did not respond 
the question.  
Hence, a key question to look into more carefully is why Argentina has so few large 
firms. Given the prevalence of small and medium firms, it also leads to another question: 
How to promote financial instruments that can be used by small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs)?  Asset-backed  securities  and  checks  of  deferred  payment  have  been  important 
developments on this front (see Bedoya, Fernández, González, Pernice and Streb 2007).   23 
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